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Abstract 
In this paper, we develop an information theory-based framework about cross-border acquisitions 
in the financial intermediation industry. We argue that even though “soft” information embedded 
in customer relationships of local banks can, in principle, help multinational banks (MNBs) 
overcome informational disadvantage in host countries, the cost of verification of this private 
information may, paradoxically, make local banks with significant customer relationships 
unattractive for cross-border acquisition. Further, we propose that the relationship between the 
amount of customer information embedded in an incumbent bank and the likelihood of its 
acquisition by a MNB is modified by the institutional distance between the home and host countries 
of the MNB. Specifically, the strength of the negative relationship increases with institutional 
distance between home and host countries because it increases the verification cost of private 
information with institutional distance. Our hypotheses find support in the context of Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
A fundamental characteristic of the financial intermediation industry is the pervasive informational 
asymmetry that exists between banks and potential borrowers (Brealey et al., 1977; Bhattacharya 
and Thakor, 1993; Freixas and Rochet, 2008). The consequences of this information asymmetry 
and the associated adverse selection problem for credit market failures are much discussed and well 
documented (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Williamson, 1986, 1987; Berger and Udell, 1998). It follows, 
therefore, that mechanisms that help ameliorate the informational asymmetry problem are 
beneficial for both the financial intermediaries (in the vast majority of cases, banks) and borrowers. 
Consequently, there is a large discussion of the use of collateral and relationship banking, 
mechanisms that help avert credit market failures, in the financial intermediation literature 
(Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Bester, 1987; Boot, 2000; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). 
 Relationship banking, in particular, is viewed as a widely used mechanism to overcome the 
problem of information asymmetry. As argued by Berger and Udell (2002), it facilitates 
“accumulation over time by the loan officer [of a bank] of ‘soft’ information” about potential 
borrowers. While such a relationship can be mixed blessing for the borrowers who may have greater 
access to external finance but at a higher cost (Greenbaum et al., 1989; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Schenone, 2010; Bolton et al., 2016), largely because it ensures that banks have monopoly over the 
information about the borrowers with whom they have such relationships, it has been argued that 
relationship banking can be the source of competitive advantage for banks (Keltner, 1995). This is 
consistent with a wider, albeit underdeveloped, literature about the ability to reduce information 
costs – in the presence of informational asymmetry – as a source of competitive advantage (Nayyar, 
1990). It is also consistent with the broader argument that resources such as information about 
borrowers (henceforth, interchangeably called customers), especially “soft” information, is not 
easily imitable outside a bank with which a set of customers have a relationship and that, therefore, 
such information can be a source of competitive advantage (Barney et al., 2001; Miller, 2003). 
Indeed, it has been argued that the risk of adverse selection in credit markets that is experienced by 
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new banks can act as an entry barrier in the banking industry (Dell’Ariccio et al., 1999; Dell’Ariccio, 
2001), i.e., private information about the borrowers give the incumbent banks competitive 
advantage.  
This has two implications for the international business literature. To begin with, when a 
multinational bank (MNB) enters a new country, informational asymmetry with local borrowers 
will put it at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis incumbent banks.1 A MNB, therefore, is at an 
informational disadvantage in a host country, especially in emerging economy contexts where 
public sources of information such as credit history records are often incomplete or altogether 
unavailable, and where the options to screen potential customers by way of mechanisms such as 
externally assigned credit ratings are restricted or altogether absent. This disadvantage can force 
MNBs to focus mostly or entirely on clients about whom information is relatively easily available, 
namely, multinational enterprises (MNEs) from the home countries of the MNBs and large (or blue 
chip) domestic firms (Miller and Parkhe, 1998; Mutinelli and Piscitello, 2001; Mian, 2006; Berger 
et al., 2008). This restriction, in turn, makes it difficult for MNBs to grow their businesses 
significantly in the host country. Berger et al. (2008) demonstrate this in the context of India, where 
foreign banks operate on their own through branches and wholly-owned subsidiaries, and account 
for less than 10 percent of both the deposit and credit markets even after more than 20 years of 
banking sector reforms. 
A MNB can use acquisition of a local bank, in which information about a pool of local 
borrowers are embedded by way of existing customer relationships, to overcome this disadvantage.2 
                                                          
1 In some sense, a MNB entering a host country suffers from the “liability of outsidership” (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 2009) because it is not part of the bank-client network. The MNB has to overcome this liability not 
so much through “trust-building and knowledge creation”, as in Johanson and Vahlne’s (2009) paradigm, but 
through relationship-building that helps them overcome their information asymmetry vis-à-vis their 
customers. (Note that we deliberately use the phrase “liability of outsidership”, as opposed to “liability of 
foreignness” that is used in discussions about internationalisation, largely because, as mentioned earlier, the 
problem of access to private information of customers can also pose an entry barrier for domestic entrants to 
the market for financial intermediation.) 
2 A perusal of the literature on internationalisation of banks suggests that de facto the acquisition of a local 
(or host country) bank may be the only choice available to a MNB other than a Greenfield entry, for a variety 
of factors such as the absence of robust and financially viable host country partners (see, for example, Bonin 
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Evidence suggests that the information embedded within customer relationships can be particularly 
valuable in contexts characterised by economic flux and crises (Ferri et al., 2001; Banerjee et al., 
2017). However, in choosing the acquisition of an incumbent bank, the MNB would trade one form 
of informational asymmetry for another. Specifically, while the acquired incumbent bank may have 
“soft” information that helps reduce informational asymmetry with local customers, the MNB may 
not be privy to this information prior to the acquisition. The MNB would, therefore, have to strike 
a balance between the advantages associated with access to the customer information embedded in 
incumbent banks (especially the “soft” information) and the risks associated with acquiring an 
incumbent bank that may not – indeed, by very nature of “soft” information, perhaps cannot – share 
this information prior to the acquisition. Alternatively, as argued in the information economics 
literature, which eschews a binary can-cannot distinction in favour of a discussion about the cost 
of verification of the nature and cost of information, the MNB’s ability to verify the nature and 
quality of the private (“soft”) information about customer relationships embedded in incumbent 
banks can be fairly high before the incumbent bank is actually acquired. 
In this paper, we contribute to the theory of strategic decisions about cross-border 
acquisitions, extending a relatively small literature (Chari and Chang, 2009; Dikova et al., 2010; 
Cuypers et al., 2015), and develop an information theory-based framework specifically about the 
financial intermediation industry. We also add to the relatively small literature on strategic 
decisions of companies when their acquisition targets – more broadly, counterparties – have private 
information (Capron and Shen, 2007; Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009). Specifically, we bring 
together two different strands of the literature, namely, the literature on market failure in the 
                                                          
et al., 1998). Indeed, available data suggests that foreign bank entry in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
during the first decade and a half of transition were almost entirely Greenfield entry as subsidiaries/branches 
or involved cross-border acquisitions (e.g., Claeys and Hainz, 2006; Hryckiewicz and Kowaleswki, 2008). 
In other words, access to private information about local customers in a host country may not be accessible 
by alternative means such as a joint venture (JV) arrangement with a local bank. While this is not germane 
to the narrative of the paper, which is not about entry mode choice of MNBs, it is nevertheless an interesting 
observation that underlines the importance of acquisitions in the process of internationalization of MNBs. 
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presence of information asymmetry which has wide-ranging applications (Akerlof, 1970), and that 
on institutional distance that has implications for strategic decisions in international business (Xu 
and Shenkar, 2002; Eden and Miller, 2004; Gaur and Lu, 2007). To be fair, our conceptual 
framework has greater relevance for MNB decisions to acquire local banks in emerging economy 
contexts where markets for information are highly imperfect. However, the basic reasoning has 
much wider implications. 
We propose that the informational asymmetry about the nature and quality of these 
customer relationships, and the attendant risk of adverse selection, would result in a negative 
relationship between the amount of customer relationship embedded in an incumbent bank and the 
likelihood of its acquisition by a MNB. Given the importance of this embedded customer 
information for competitive advantage in the banking industry, this is apparently paradoxical but, 
as in the case of Dushnitsky and Shaver’s (2009) study of firms’ (un)willingness to accept 
investment from corporate venture capital firms belonging to the same industry, entirely logical.3 
Further, we propose that the relationship between the amount of customer information embedded 
in an incumbent bank and the likelihood of its acquisition by a MNB is moderated by the 
institutional distance between the home and host countries of the MNB. Specifically, the strength 
of the aforementioned negative relationship increases with institutional distance between home and 
host countries as the verification cost of private information embedded in incumbent banks 
increases with institutional distance. The propositions (or hypotheses) are tested using data on 
acquisition of local banks by MNBs in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) context, and the 
empirical results support the hypotheses.  
 
 
                                                          
3 The key difference between intuition for the paradox discussed in Dushnitsky and Shaver’s (2009) paper 
and that of ours is that moral hazard lies at the heart of the mechanism that explains their paradox while, as 
mentioned above, adverse selection lies at the heart of ours. However, both moral hazard and adverse 
selection follows from informational asymmetry between two transacting parties. 
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2. Hypotheses development 
To reiterate the problem of a MNB, it can enhance its competitiveness in a host country market if 
it gains access to the private information about potential borrowers/customers that are embedded 
in bank-customer relationships in the incumbent banks. The MNB can get access to the headline 
information such as the amount and tenor of loans (and perhaps even details about repayment terms 
and covenants) associated with each of these relationships, by acquiring a local bank, and access to 
such hard information is generally available during the customary due diligence process prior to 
the acquisition. However, it may not get all the relevant information about the nature of these 
relationships that are necessary to fully (at least, sufficiently) understand the credit risk associated 
with the customers with whom the incumbent banks have had business relationships. Indeed, it may 
even be in the interest of the acquired incumbent bank to deliberately obscure certain aspects of 
these relationships that have implications for the true credit risk associated with these customers.4  
 It is easy to comprehend this problem in the context of emerging economy locations that 
are characterised by a variety of credit market imperfections which have implications for the credit 
risk associated with borrowers with whom incumbent banks have existing relationships. For 
example, banks in these countries often favour incumbent firms that have long standing 
relationships with the banks but weak performance and/or little growth prospect (Banerjee et al., 
2005; Malesky and Taussig, 2009),5 those that are credit risks on their own but are able to draw on 
implicit and explicit guarantees of related firms within business networks (Fisman and Wang, 2010), 
and those that have political connections (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Claessens et al., 2008; Li et al., 
                                                          
4 A similar phenomenon can be observed in cases where it may not be in a firm’s interest to reveal information 
about its technology to corporate venture capitalist (CVC) belonging to the same industry (Dushnitsky and 
Shaver, 2009). However, while this follows from the risk of expropriation of the technology by the CVC, in 
our context the risk to the incumbent bank involves the potential cost of releasing information about 
inefficient and irregular lending practices.  
5 Costa et al. (2014) observe that “[a]lthough credit is a major source of risk and revenue for the vast majority 
of banks in emerging economies, credit processes and underlying support mechanisms have remained largely 
unchanged in most—even when some banks grew tenfold. For example, many banks still do not effectively 
use predictive statistical models (such as scoring models or behavioral scoring) in underwriting and 
monitoring, although they may have made significant investments to acquire these tools.” (pp. 6) 
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2008). Where credit risk of an individual firm is ameliorated by guarantees provided by firms in its 
wider business network (e.g., in the case of firms associated with business groups), the true value 
of these guarantees can be suspect on account of opacity and weak corporate governance of firms 
within these networks (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Claessens and Fan, 2003). Similarly, where the 
customers in question are state-owned firms, their credit worthiness sans implicit or assumed 
government guarantees can be questionable on account of persistent performance-related problems 
(see Megginson and Netter, 2001; Bhaumik and Estrin, 2007, and references therein). Further, 
lending decisions may be influenced by outright bribery (Chen et al., 2013). 
 These contexts are also characterised by practices such as evergreening of loans – simply 
put, granting new loans to customers to enable them to make (past) due interest payments and 
principal repayments for past loans – that obscure the real credit risk associated with loans unless 
they are closely scrutinised. 6  These practices may be driven by high costs of bankruptcy 
proceedings, high cost of capital for banks that require recapitalisation after nonperforming assets 
have been recognised and written off, and relationships with some borrowers that prevent banks 
from driving them into bankruptcy and attaching their assets. Even when emerging economies may 
adopt the accounting rules (including Basel norms)7 of developed countries, these rules may not be 
sufficient to shed light on incidents of evergreening (Caprio and Honohan, 1999). Where these 
practices are commonplace, the true credit risks associated with customers with whom a local bank 
has relationships – the “soft” information – may not be revealed until after a MNB completes the 
acquisition of a local bank. 
                                                          
6 There is widespread evidence about evergreening of loans in the banking literature (Rosengren, 1999; Hoshi 
and Kashyap, 2004; Watanabe, 2010, and the references therein; Alessandri and Drehmann, 2010; Fisman et 
al., 2011). 
7 Basel rules suggest that a loan should be classified as non-performing not only if a borrower defaults or if 
the loan is impaired, but also if the “exposure” is more than 190 days past due (BIS, 2016). Additionally, the 
rules require that “collateralisation should have no influence on the categorisation of an exposure as non-
performing” (pp. 9), and that, in most cases, all exposures to a counterparty (i.e., a customer) should be 
considered non-performing if any of the exposures is non-performing. It is easy to see how this is inconsistent 
with an agreement to evergreen loans when a customer finds it difficult to meet its repayment obligations. 
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 While these problems are likely to be more acute in the context of emerging economies, 
the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States demonstrates that these problems are equally 
feasible in more developed contexts. Available evidence suggests, for example, that low 
documentation loans that result in borrower information falsification was one of the major problems 
underlying the crisis (Jiang et al., 2014). Further, once the mortgages were securitised, it was costly 
for investors to identify the true default risks associated with the mortgages underlying the 
securities, despite the presence of mechanisms such as credit rating that were meant to reveal 
accurate information about the credit risk associated with the securities. Indeed, it has been argued 
that credit rating agencies may have contributed to the crisis (Sy, 2009). Finally, in some developed 
contexts such as Japan and Western Europe, banks have also been known to evergreen loans, 
especially when they are in distress and when the need for regulatory capital is high (Spiegel and 
Yamori, 2003; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2004; Caballero et al., 2008; Albertazzi and Marchetti, 2010; 
Watanabe, 2010; Steinkamp et al., 2017). However, while the presence of information sources such 
as credit registers in Spain can help shed light on credit risk associated with borrowers and practices 
such as evergreening (Jimenez et al., 2012),8 these information sources are at best underdeveloped 
in emerging economies (Costa et al., 2014). As a consequence, the problem associated with 
imperfect information about bank-customer relationships may be more acute in emerging 
economies than in developed contexts. 
 To summarize, therefore, a MNB that aims to acquire private information about borrowers-
customers in a new host country by acquiring a local bank within whose customer relationships this 
information is embedded may have broad sense about the prevalence of irregular lending practices 
in the host country but may find it difficult or very costly to identify the true credit risks associated 
                                                          
8 Jappelli and Pagano (2000) make the following distinction between credit bureaus and credit registers: 
“‘Credit bureaus’ (sometimes called ‘credit reference agencies’) are typical voluntary mechanisms: they are 
information brokers, which operate on the principle of reciprocity, collecting, filing and distributing the 
information supplied privately by their members. …. ‘Public credit registers’, instead, are databases created 
by public authorities and managed by central banks. Their data are compulsorily reported by lenders, who 
then obtain a return flow of data for use in their lending decisions.” 
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with the customer relationships of individual incumbent banks. It is well understood that in such 
cases there is lemons problem (Akerlof, 1970; Parviven and Tikkanen, 2007), such that it may not 
be possible for a MNB to conclude a deal for acquisition of an incumbent bank. Where these 
acquisitions are feasible by way of exchange of shares, the MNB may proceed by offering shares 
that can force the shareholders of the acquired firm to share risks with the MNB (Hansen, 1987; 
Chemmanur et al., 2009). Alternatively, where possible, the MNB can acquire the local-incumbent 
bank using contingent earnout contracts (Rogozzino and Reuer, 2007). However, these risk-sharing 
mechanisms may not be universally available and, specifically, are likely to be infeasible in the 
context of emerging economies, for a variety of factors such as government ownership of 
incumbent banks in the host country and weak institutions for contract enforcement. For example, 
Godard et al. (2012) report that, on average, cash accounted for 82 percent of the payment for cross-
border acquisition of emerging economy banks in their sample, the median value of cash payment 
being 100 percent. Paradoxically, therefore, the likelihood of an incumbent bank’s acquisition by a 
MNB may decrease with the extent of customer relationships embedded in the incumbent bank, 
despite the well understood importance of the private information associated with those 
relationships for competitive advantage of banks. 
 We, therefore, hypothesize the following: 
 Hypothesis 1 (H1). The likelihood of acquisition of a local-incumbent bank by a MNB 
decreases with the extent of customer relationships embedded in the local bank. 
As mentioned earlier, in keeping with the literature on information theory, it is possible to 
argue that information about the true credit risk associated with customers with whom incumbent 
banks have relationships is not binary in nature, i.e., it is not either “private” or “public”. Instead, 
we can argue that, in principle, all information can be verified at a cost, and that the cost is high for 
information that is truly private (e.g., Webb, 1992; Li, 1998). Further, a MNB’s ability to verify the 
credit risks associated with the aforementioned customer relationships before acquiring a local-
incumbent bank, i.e., the cost of verification, is likely to be influenced by the institutional distance 
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between the home and host countries of a MNB that reflects the institutional (dis)similarity of the 
MNB. Indeed, it is reasonable to argue that for a MNB this cost increases with the institutional 
distance between its home country and a given host country.  
This is easily understood once we view institutions as rules of the game (Ostrom, 1986; 
North, 1993; Williamson, 1998). The best practices associated with lending and management of 
credit risk are well understood and widely known (e.g., BIS, 2000). At the same time, banks around 
the world are increasingly governed by similar formal rules and regulations, generally those agreed 
upon by the Basel Committee. These regulations may, correspondingly, have similar effects on 
decisions of banks regarding credit and other risks in very different credit market contexts. For 
example, evidence suggests that Basel norms regarding capital adequacy, which requires banks to 
increase equity and other acceptable forms of capital in line with the credit and other risks to which 
they are exposed, have an impact on their lending behaviour across the world (e.g., Kishan and 
Opiela, 2000; Gambacorta and Mistruli, 2004). If all banks around the world played by the global 
formal rules of the game alone, therefore, institutional distance may not have mattered. 
However, to begin with, practices, laws and regulations that are transplanted from one 
context to another, e.g., from a developed context to emerging economies, may have low legitimacy 
and hence low effectiveness, unless the context in which these laws etc. are transplanted are already 
familiar with them (Berkowitz et al., 2003). Further, individual lending decisions by banks and 
their officials/managers are affected by local informal rules and norms as well. Politicians, for 
example, have different degrees of influence on lending decisions by banks across countries which, 
in part, is determined by the ownership structure of banks operating in specific contexts. Similarly, 
the extent to which bank officials are influenced by non-commercial factors such as corruption can 
vary considerably across countries (Barth et al., 2008), depending on not only economic factors 
such as banking sector competition (e.g., Barth et al., 2009) but quite possibly also factors such as 
the social ties of managers-officials (Collins et al., 2009) and, more generally, the social acceptance 
of (or tolerance for) corruption (Jain, 2001: pp. 83; Cameron et al., 2009). By extension, the 
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prevalence of practices such as evergreening can to be influenced by the importance the local bank 
officials and borrowers place on social relationships (Fisman et al., 2017). Given that, by their very 
nature, these informal rules of the game are not codified and are internalised by individuals and 
organisations operating within specific social contexts (McAdams, 1997), it is easy to see how 
institutional distance between two countries, which reflects differences in both formal and informal 
rules of the game, can increase the verification cost of the risk associated with the customer 
relationships embedded in the banks. 
Institutional distance may, therefore, influence a banks’ decisions to invest in overseas 
locations (Galiendo et al., 2003).9 In the context of our paper, the verification cost of the private 
information that incumbent host country banks have about borrowers, and hence the acuteness of 
the aforementioned lemon’s problem, may increase with institutional distance between the home 
and host countries of a MNB. This can have an adverse effect on the likelihood of acquisition of a 
local-incumbent bank. We propose that institutional distance can, on its own reduce the likelihood 
of acquisition of a local-incumbent bank by a MNB, and that this distance can also moderate the 
paradox of the inverse relationship between the extent of customer relationships embedded in a 
local-incumbent bank and its likelihood of acquisition by a MNB. 
Specifically, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a). The likelihood of a local-incumbent bank’s acquisition by a MNB 
decreases with an increase in the institutional distance between the home and host countries of the 
MNB. 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b). Given the extent of embedded customer information in a local-
incumbent bank, the likelihood of a local-incumbent bank’s acquisition by a MNB reduces at a 
                                                          
9 In a related literature, it has been argued that a plausible explanation for “home bias” in equity holdings is 
the information cost experienced by investors when invest overseas, and this cost is particularly high when 
investors from developed countries such as the USA invest in foreign contexts that have relatively few 
overlapping institutions with the developed home country contexts of the investors (Ahearne, Griever and 
Warnock, 2004; Jeske, 2001). 
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faster rate with an increase in the extent of institutional distance between the home and host 
countries of the MNB. 
 
3. Context of analysis and data   
3.1 Context of analysis 
Our analysis focuses on the mode of foreign entry in the banking industries of the following CEE 
host countries: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, FYR Macedonia, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.10 During the 
transition process of the 1990s, many foreign banks entered these countries either as greenfield or 
cross-border acquisitions. This outcome was pre-ordained by the structure of banking in these 
countries during the socialist era. Nearly all transition economies inherited a monobank with 
multiple subsidiaries, and the first stage of banking reform in these countries – which varied 
considerably across countries – involved the creation of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) 
by splitting up the monobank system. These banks were weak, with significant levels of non-
performing assets and limited banking expertise, and, with sweeping changes in the political and 
economic landscape, the strength of their relationships with governments and regulators had 
weakened considerably. While some countries encouraged market entry by domestic private banks, 
these banks “often featured low capitalization and close connections to businesses” (International 
Monetary Fund, 2014; pp. 41), without necessarily having significantly greater banking expertise 
than the SOCBs. This was not surprising because, during the socialist period, banks performed 
accounting functions instead of acting as proper financial intermediaries and therefore skills in the 
art of credit evaluation, among other things, was at a premium (Corbett and Mayer, 1991). As such, 
domestic banks in transition economies were not desirable JV partners, tilting the balance in favour 
                                                          
10 These were a group of CEE transition countries which were growing well during the 2000-08 period under 
study: the sample host countries, as a whole, experienced an average growth rate of about 5% over this period, 
which is roughly comparable with the growth rate of about 5.2% in some Asian countries (e.g., see Prasad, 
2009). 
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of foreign entry by way of greenfield and acquisition.  
This was further facilitated by government policy. As reported by Bonin et al. (2012), 
governments in these countries viewed foreign bank participation as a vehicle to import banking 
expertise; but while some countries encouraged greenfield entry through tax holidays etc., others 
such as Hungary foreign bank entry by way of cross-border acquisition was facilitated by 
privatization of SOCBs. Indeed, with the exception of Slovenia, privatization was the dominant 
form of banking sector reform in these countries (Wihlborg, 2004), and in the absence of strong 
private domestic banks, privatization was largely associated with sale to foreign banks.  
Further, many of these countries, which experienced a prolonged period of transition in 
their economic, political and legal institutions since 1989, were characterised by institutional 
weaknesses – important manifestations of which are pervasive corruption and weak rule of law – 
during the transition process (Varese, 2000). Decisions about loans could, therefore, have been 
made on the basis of factors that did not accurately reflect the credit risk associated with the 
borrower (and the associated business or project). It has been documented, for example, that during 
the 1990s banks had extended loans to state-owned enterprises to enable them to escape hard budget 
constraints (Borish, Long and Noel, 1995). Often, “[u]npaid interest and principal were rolled over, 
increasing dramatically the banks’ stock of nonperforming loans” (The World Bank, 1996). In 
addition, the 1990s were also characterised by continuation of “related party lending and political 
intervention into credit allocation” in many of these countries (Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer, 2000). At 
the same time, the resources needed to create institutions such as accounting and auditing practices 
in these countries imposed “massive additional burdens” on their governments and economies (The 
World Bank, 1996; pp. 16). Disclosure standards of even hard information were deemed 
rudimentary, in comparison with international best practices. In other words, verification cost of 
private information associated with customer relationships embedded in domestic banks in these 
countries could very high, especially for MNBs hailing from countries that had very different 
institutions. The CEE context, therefore, provides an interesting and relevant context for testing our 
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hypotheses. 
 
3.2 Data 
Our data are collected from three different sources. The ownership information of incumbent CEE 
banks, which enables us to identify acquisition of (some of) these banks by MNBs, is obtained from 
de Haas et al. (2011). This data also enables us to verify change of ownership status of a bank 
during the sample period of 2000-2008.11 A third of the CEE banks in our sample were acquired 
by foreign banks.  
 We add to this data financial information about the incumbent CEE banks that are obtained 
from much used Bankscope data obtained from Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (e.g., Jeon 
et al., 2011; Barth et al., 2013). As we discuss later, this financial information is used to construct 
the measure of customer relationships embedded within the incumbent banks. We also add 
information about competition in the banking sectors in the CEE countries – the proxy for which is 
the Herfindahl index that is computed using Bankscope data – and that about annual GDP growth 
rates of the CEE countries. These account for some of our control variables.  
Finally, we add to this data two measures of country level institutions that are the basis for 
constructing a measure of institutional distance between home and host countries of MNBs. Our 
measures of institutions are taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators that are discussed in 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009), which is an updated version of the institutional indices 
constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002), both on account of its popularity (e.g., 
Galindo et al., 2003; Cull et al., 2011; Lensink et al., 2008) and because it is available for all the 
countries in our sample.12 Specifically, we choose corruption and rule of law as the measures of 
                                                          
11 We stop considering beyond 2008 as we wanted to avoid our results to be affected by the last financial 
crisis that started around this time and also affected the sample countries.  
12 Other comparable indices widely employed in studies on corruption include the Transparency International 
index (TI index) and the International country risk Guide (ICRG) index, which were not available for all the 
sample countries under consideration. The challenge with using such perception-based indices is that 
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institutions. There are two key reasons for choosing these proxies of institutional quality. First, 
these two are fairly common measures of institutions, e.g., corruption in Kwok and Tadesse (2006) 
and Meyer et al. (2009), and rule of law in Rodrik et al. (2004). Second, in our judgement, these 
are consistent with the focus of the hypotheses developed earlier in the paper. Absence of rule of 
law implies deviation from set rules and/or differential treatment of individuals and organisations 
who should, in principle, be treated similarly. When banks lend to companies (or evergreen their 
bad loans) based on factors such as their political connections and social networks, they are in 
violation of rule of law. Corruption, which is correlated with most other measures of institutions 
including rule of law, implies the ability of individuals and organisations to enter into transactions 
that are in violation of set criteria (e.g., lending criteria), and rules and regulations (e.g., the spirit 
of Basel regulations about recognition of bad loans). Further, corruption implies that these 
deviations remain obscure, within the domain of private information of the transacting parties (Li 
et al., 2015). 
The final sample includes 538 bank-year observations, and it includes CEE banks that have 
been acquired by MNBs and those that have not been acquired. 
 
4. Model and main variables 
4.1 Model 
To recapitulate, we aim to examine the effects of the risk associated with the private (often “soft”) 
information about relationships with borrowers that are embedded in incumbent banks that are 
potential acquisition targets of MNBs, institutional distance between home and host countries of 
MNBs, and the interaction between these two factors on the likelihood of acquisition of local banks. 
Our outcome variable of interest TO is defined as follows: TO = 1 if a local bank was acquired by 
a MNB, and is 0 if the bank remains domestic. The time period of acquisition could be any of the 
                                                          
perceptions may well be formed not only by conventional wisdom, but also by existing climatic conditions 
such as current economic performance of the country (Aidt, 2003). 
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years in our 2000-2008 sample period. 
 Our interest lies in understanding how the aforementioned factors affect the acquisition of 
an incumbent bank in a CEE country by a MNB. Since the observed status of an incumbent bank 
can change during any of the years in our sample period, and given that this change in status results 
from a strategic decision by MNBs that are exogenous to the incumbent banks themselves, we treat 
each bank-year observation as an independent observation. Econometrically, following Dushnitsky 
and Shaver (2009), we estimate the probability that a MNB i will acquire an incumbent bank j in 
year t, using a probit maximum likelihood approach. The pooled nature of our data enables us to 
control for unobserved time effects accounting for any positive/negative shocks over the sample 
years. As such, the likelihood of acquisition TO is given by the following equation:  
TOjt = β0 + β1CUSjt + β2IDjt + β3(IDjt* CUSjt) + Φ’ Z + ujt   (1) 
where TOjt is as defined above, CUS is a measure of the customer relationships embedded in the 
local banks, ID is a measure of the institutional distance between the home and host countries of 
the MNB, Z is a vector of control variables (see discussion in Section 4.2), Φ is a vector of 
coefficients for the Z variables, and u is the error term.  
 After careful consideration, we use our chosen proxies for institutional quality, and the 
associated measures of institutional distance, separately in our regression model. In doing so, we 
are consistent with studies such as Keefer and Knack (1997), Rodrik et al. (2004) and Meyer et al. 
(2009) that have used single measures of institutions such as corruption, rule of law and contract 
enforcement in their regression specifications. In part, this is necessitated by the fact that most 
measures of institutions are highly correlated.13 However, as mentioned earlier, the underlying 
rationale is that these measures are individually consistent with our narrative about the private 
nature of the “soft” information about customer relationship embedded in CEE banks, and the cost 
of verifying this information. Other Worldwide Governance Indicators such as indices for voice 
                                                          
13 For example, for the CEE countries in our sample, the correlation between control of corruption and 
bureaucratic quality is 0.66, while that between control of corruption and democratic accountability is 0.55. 
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and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, and government effectiveness are 
not compatible with the focus of our narrative and aggregating these measures in some way would 
considerably weaken any interpretation of our regression estimates. 14 
 
4.2 Main variables 
Our dependent variable TO has already been defined above. The explanatory variables used in 
equation (1) have been constructed using the data sources discussed above. The definitions of all 
variables used in the empirical analysis are described in Table 1. 
Customer relationships (CUS): As argued in this paper, a bank’s ownership advantage lies 
with (or are embedded in) its relationships with its customers. The more a bank’s assets are credit-
relationship based, and the larger its share of the domestic credit market, the greater is the 
ownership advantage embedded with that bank. We, therefore, measure customer relationships 
embedded in a (local) bank by the loans-to-total assets ratio.15 We argue that the greater the size of 
the loans ratio, the greater is the extent of private information held by the incumbent bank and 
therefore the greater is the verification cost.  
Institutional distance (ID): As indicated above, we use the control of corruption index and 
rule of law index of Kaufman et al. (2009) as proxies for institutional quality. The value of the 
former ranges from -2.5 to 2.5; higher values indicate less corrupt countries, while lower values 
will indicate more corrupt countries. Similarly, for the rule of law index, a higher value indicates 
                                                          
14 By the same token, while the use of a composite index such as the Heritage Foundation “economic freedom” 
index, which includes a wide range of factors such as rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency and 
open markets, may be appropriate for a discussion of transactions cost and institutional quality generally, it 
is not a good fit with our information theory-based narrative.  
15 Ideally, one would like to have information on the number of customer relationships embedded in banks, 
the length of these relationships, the scope of these relationships (e.g., whether a customer has just a current 
account and an overdraft facility at a bank or whether the bank is also a provider of other services to the 
customer that facilitates collection of “soft” information), and nature of the covenants associated with loans 
(where applicable). However, given that this data is unavailable, we rely on bank-level information on total 
loan size as a share of total assets as our proxy for customer relationships. The implicit (and reasonable) 
assumption is that the more customer relationships a bank has, when measured in dollars, the greater would 
be the extent of private information associated with these relationships which a MNB would find difficult to 
verify. 
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greater adherence to rule of law, and vice versa. In order to facilitate interpretation of the regression 
results, we reverse the scale of the corruption measure, such that a higher value of the index 
indicates higher corruption (instead of control of corruption). The two alternative measures of 
institutional distance are measured as the difference between the measures of the relevant index in 
the host (i.e., CEE) country and the home country of a MNB. As evident from Figure 1, that, by 
and large, corruption was higher and rule of law weaker in the CEE host countries than in the home 
countries of the MNBs.  
 Following convention in the international business literature (see Bhaumik et al, 2010; pp. 
443), the implications of the hypotheses for the regression coefficients can be enumerated as 
follows: 
  Institutional distance 
 Variables Corruption 
based 
Rule of law 
based 
Hypothesis 1: CUS β1 < 0 β1 < 0 
Hypothesis 2a: ID β2 < 0 β2 < 0 
Hypothesis 2b: ID*CUS β3 < 0 β3 < 0 
 
Control variables: We control for characteristics of incumbent CEE banks such as size 
(Petrou and Thanos, 2014), and age (Bonin et al., 2005).16 We use two dummy variables that 
indicate whether a bank is large or medium sized – based on the size distribution of banks within 
each host country, with small banks as the omitted category. In addition, our perusal of the literature 
on banking suggests that factors such as the degree of competition may matter as well (Casu and 
Girardone, 2006). We use the Herfindahl index of host country banking sector as the proxy for 
competition. In particular, we construct the Herfindahl index for deposits of the context bank 
                                                          
16 The legacy of socialist era governance structures increases with a bank’s age. 
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relative to all other banks in the host country. We control for macroeconomic conditions in the host 
countries using measures of GDP growth. Finally, we control for unobserved year effects using 
appropriate dummy variables. 
 
4.3 Summary statistics 
Table 2 summarises the descriptive statistics of the key regression variables along with data source. 
On an average, about 37% of host banks had been acquired by MNB. The average value of customer 
relationships (CUS) is about 0.20 and, as we have already observed (Figure 1), institutions are, by 
and large, weaker in the host CEE countries than in the home countries of the MNBs. Considering 
other characteristics, host banks are, on an average, 13-14 years old. In general, host banks are 
reasonably large and host country banking sectors are fragmented, with a low Herfindahl index of 
0.06. Finally, many of the sample host countries had decent GDP growth rates resulting in an 
average of nearly 5%.  
 The correlations are reported in Table 3. The correlation matrix suggests that there is not 
much cause for worry about multicollinearity. The variance inflation factor (VIF) associated with 
the regression model is estimated to be 1.0407, much lower than the usual threshold value of 5. 
This confirms that there is little cause for concern about multicollinearity in our sample.   
 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1 Results 
The regression results are reported in Table 4. In keeping with the discussion earlier in the paper, 
we report the results for two alternative measures of institutional distance, one based on corruption 
and the other based on rule of law. Further, in keeping with Dusknitsky and Shaver (2009), we 
report both the probit coefficients and the marginal effects. The standard errors of the probit 
coefficients and marginal effects are corrected for heteroskedasticity. The likelihood ratio (LR) test 
indicates that both the regression models are meaningful. At the same time, the results indicate that 
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a number of variables in the regression specification – including the key variables of CUS, ID and 
their interaction – are individually statistically significant. The results are robust to the choice of 
the proxy for institutional distance. 
 The results are consistent with our hypotheses.  
 H1: The probit estimates and the corresponding marginal effects indicate that the 
likelihood of an acquisition of an incumbent CEE bank in our sample, by a MNB, indeed decreases 
with the extent of private information about customer relationships embedded in the former. The 
probit coefficient and the marginal effects for CUS are negative (and significant) for both the 
regression models. Our HI, therefore, is supported by our empirical results.  
H2a: Consistent with our expectations, the likelihood of acquisition of an incumbent CEE 
bank decreases with the institutional distance (ID) between the host CEE countries and the home 
countries of MNBs. The probit estimate and the associated marginal effect are negative (and 
significant) as institutional distance increases irrespective of whether we use the corruption-based 
institutional distance measure or the rule of law-based institutional distance measure. Our H2a, 
therefore, is supported by our empirical results. 
H2b: Finally, the interaction term between CUS and ID has a negative (and significant) 
coefficient and marginal effect and this holds for both the ID measures. In other words, given the 
extent of private information about customer relationships embedded in incumbent CEE banks, the 
likelihood of acquisition decreases when the ID measure in a MNB’s host country increases relative 
to home country. Our H2b, therefore, is supported by our empirical results. 
 Overall, the results support our theoretical argument. Even though access to private (and 
“soft”) customer information embedded in incumbent CEE banks can add to competitive advantage 
of MNBs, the private nature of this information and the associated problem of adverse selection, 
reduces the likelihood of acquisition by multinational banks precisely when their extent of customer 
relationship, and hence private information, increases. While this is apparently paradoxical, this is 
perfectly consistent with rational behaviour in information theory. Further, since verification cost 
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for this private (and embedded) information increases with institutional distance between the host 
and home countries of MNBs, the likelihood of acquisition decreases with increase in institutional 
distance, for all amounts of the aforementioned private information. 
 The regression estimates for the control variables suggest that the likelihood of acquisition 
is higher for a medium sized or large incumbent bank relative to the small banks, which is consistent 
with evidence that suggests that larger CEE banks are more efficient (Yildirim and Philippatos, 
2007), and therefore more attractive acquisition targets. This likelihood decreases with the age of 
incumbent banks, which possibly suggests that MNB are not keen to acquire banks with relatively 
strong socialist legacies. Finally, the likelihood of acquisition increases with the increase in market 
concentration in the host CEE country banking sectors, which is consistent with the available 
literature on cross-border acquisitions in the European banking context (Hernando et al., 2012). 
 
5.2 Discussion 
Contributions. In this paper we develop an information theory-based framework to discuss 
strategic decisions about cross-border acquisitions in the banking industry, thereby contributing to 
the literatures on cross-border acquisitions in general (Chari and Chang, 2009; Dikova et al., 2010; 
Cuypers et al., 2015), and strategic interactions between companies when one (or both) of them has 
private information that cannot be easily (or costlessly) be observed by the other (Capron and Shen, 
2007; Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009). Theoretically, we argue that (1) even though acquisition of a 
local bank in which “soft” information about local customers are embedded would help a MNB 
overcome a competitive disadvantage in a host country, the cost associated with pre-acquisition 
verification of this information would, paradoxically, make local banks with large stock of 
embedded information about customers less attractive targets for acquisition; and (2) the likelihood 
of this market failure would increase with increase in institutional distance between the host and 
home countries of the MNBs which, we argue, is correlated with the aforementioned verification 
cost. Specifically, we argue that this institutional distance would reduce the likelihood of 
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acquisition of a host country bank on its own, and also modify the negative relationship between 
the extent of customer information embedded in a host country bank and the likelihood of its 
acquisition.   
 Empirically, we test these hypotheses in the context of CEE countries which were 
characterised by opaque lending decisions that may have been affected by relationships between 
the banks and their customers, state-intervention and corrupt practices. These countries were also 
characterised by weak disclosure norms and the absence of formal institutions such as credit 
registers that made verification of the true nature of the customer relationships embedded within 
banks costly. At the same time, persistent corruption and weak rule of law in these countries during 
the transition process resulted in significant institutional distance between the host and home 
countries of MNBs that invested in the CEE countries during the transition process. Our empirical 
results are consistent with the hypotheses that are associated with our theoretical framework. 
 Managerial implications. Managers routinely deal with challenges posed by informational 
asymmetry that is manifested in a number of contexts such as labour markets (Greenwald, 1986) 
and credit markets (Sharpe, 1990). In order to deal with these challenges, they develop screening 
(e.g., setting minimum qualifications for job applicants) and signalling (e.g., by posting collateral) 
mechanisms that help mitigate them. However, in the context of acquisitions, if there is 
informational asymmetry about a key attribute of the target company and the cost of verification is 
high then overcoming this challenge may not be feasible and use of mechanisms such as share-
based acquisitions and contingent earnout contracts may not be feasible in all contexts. In such 
cases, the optimal decision may involve non-acquisition of the target company, especially when the 
target company is a different country with whose institutions the managers are not very familiar. In 
this paper, we argue that this may indeed be the case in the context of cross-border acquisitions in 
the banking sector, especially in emerging economy contexts. Acquisition in the presence of 
significant private and unverifiable “soft” information about customer relationships of the target 
banks, and in unfamiliar institutional contexts, can result in a winner’s curse (Thaler, 1988) that 
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can adversely impact a MNB’s cost of capital and performance for a number of years.  
 Limitations of the paper. To begin with, a common concern about all empirical results is 
their generalisability. The empirical analysis of this paper has been undertaken in a context that has 
undergone economic and political transition that are unique in recent history. On the one hand, this 
accentuates the problems of opaque lending practices, costly verification and institutional distance 
with MNB home countries, and this makes the CEE context suitable for testing our hypotheses. At 
the same time, it would be important to verify whether data from other emerging economy contexts, 
more generally, support the hypotheses. A second concern in empirical studies is the choice of 
proxies for key variables. In this paper, CUS is a key variable and, as we have explained earlier in 
the paper, while our proxy for it is reasonable, a measure of CUS that takes into consideration 
attributes such as the length of the relationship may be more meaningful. Future research may aim 
to address this problem by using contract-level information about customers which are unavailable 
for the CEE context but may be available for some other emerging economies. A third possible way 
to improve the empirical analysis in this paper would be to incorporate some characteristics of the 
MNBs in the regression specification, something that we were unable to do because it reduced our 
sample size considerably. A study with a wider coverage of emerging economies may be able to 
overcome this problem. Finally, by focusing on the likelihood of acquisition of local banks by 
MNBs, we have not explored two related issues, namely, how MNBs that do acquire host country 
local banks evaluate and restructure customer relationships subsequent to acquisition, and how 
MNBs that enter host countries (especially, emerging economies) using non-acquisition (in most 
cases, greenfield) mode of entry deal with the informational disadvantage in host country contexts. 
Addressing these questions in future research would, in our view, extend the literature on MNBs 
and their informational disadvantage during the process of internationalisation significantly. 
 
6. Concluding comments 
What determines the likelihood of acquisition of host country banks, especially in emerging 
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economy contexts, by MNBs, whose competitive disadvantage in host countries can be ameliorated 
by the “soft” information about customer relationships embedded in the host country banks? Our 
answer is that (1) when this information is private such that it is costly for a MNB to verify the 
nature of this information prior to acquisition, the likelihood of acquisition is influenced by this 
verification cost, and (2) the verification cost is itself influenced by the institutional distance 
between the host and home countries of the MNB such that the likelihood of acquisition is 
influenced by this institutional distance as well. In this paper, this is captured in an information 
theory-based framework that has been developed to discuss cross-border acquisitions in the banking 
industry. In conclusion, the single most important message of this paper is that informational 
asymmetry and verification cost of private information matters in the context of cross-border 
acquisitions, at least for the banking industry, and non-acquisition may paradoxically be the optimal 
decision even when access to information embedded in a target bank may grant a MNB the ability 
to overcome competitive disadvantage in a host country market. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the regression sample 2000-08 
 
Variable Abbreviation Source Measure 
Foreign takeover  TO De Haas et al. (2011) Binary indicator of acquisition of a CEE bank by a foreign bank; 
TO = 1 if a local bank was acquired by a MNB, and is 0 if the 
bank remains domestic 
Customer relationship CUS Bankscope Customer relationships embedded in CEE banks, measured by 
their loans-to-assets ratios 
Institutional distance ID Kaufman et al. 
(2009) 
The difference between host and home country institutions of 
MNBs, the proxies for institutions being corruption and rule of 
law, such that the two measures of institutional distance are 
relative corruption (RC) and relative rule of law (RRL) 
Incumbent bank age AGE Bankscope Bank age in years 
Incumbent bank size - Large LRG Bankscope Binary indicator of a large CEE bank 
Incumbent bank size – Medium  MED Bankscope Binary indicator of a medium sized CEE bank 
Host country banking sector 
competition 
COMP Bankscope The Herfindahl index which is a stylized measure of industry 
concentration and hence competition 
Host country GDP growth rate GROWTH EBRD Percentage growth rate of GDP in each host country in each year 
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Figure 1. Institutional distance 
 
 
 
Note: The measures of institutional distance are based on corruption and rule of law indices that 
are discussed in Kaufman et al. (2009). Relative corruption is the distance between host and home 
corruption indices. Similarly, relative rule of law is the distance between host and home country 
rule of law indices.  
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Table 2.  Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Variables Mean Std Dev TO CUS RC RRL MED LRG AGE COMP GROWTH 
TO 0.36 0.48 1        
 
CUS 0.19 0.29 -0.51 1       
 
RC 1.12 1.03 0.20 -0.10 1      
 
RRL -1.08 0.85 -0.04 -0.06 0.59 1     
 
MED 0.50 0,50 -0.12 0.23 0.02 -0.02 1    
 
LRG 0.18 0.38 0.01 -0.20 -0.19 -0.30 -0.53 1   
 
AGE 13.66 14.09 -0.24 0.26 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.03 1  
 
COMP 0.06 0.16 0.04 -0.10 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.23 -0.02 1  
GROWTH 4.66 2.21 0.31 -0.32 -0.29 0.07 0.03 0.006 -0.15 -0.07 1 
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Table 3. Binary probit estimates of the likelihood of acquisition of host country bank by MNB 
  
Corruption based 
institutional distance 
Rule of law based 
institutional distance 
 
Probit 
coefficient 
Marginal 
effect 
Probit 
coefficient 
Marginal 
effect 
Hypothesis 1     
CUS - 0.47** - 0.12** - 1.37*** - 0.38*** 
   (0.23)   (0.06)   (0.39)   (0.11) 
Hypothesis 2a     
ID - 0.22*** - 0.06*** -0.19** -0.0548**  
  (0.06)   (0.01)  (0.0226) 
Hypothesis 2b     
ID*CUS - 0.93*** - 0.25***  - 0.64** -0.17**  
  (0.29)   (0.08)   (0.26) (0.0759)  
    
Host bank controls     
MED   0.68***    0.71***   
  (0.16)    (0.16)  
LRG   1.26***    1.33***   
  (0.22)    (0.23)  
AGE - 0.17***  - 0.16***   
  (0.02)    (0.02)  
Host country control     
COMP - 2.43***  - 2.50***  
   (0.52)    (0.55)  
GROWTH   0.01    0.05  
   (0.03)    (0.03)  
     
Constant   0.55  - 0.001   
   (0.37)    (0.37)  
     
Year dummies   Yes    Yes  
LR stat χ2    106.30    95.12  
  
36 
 
(p-value)   (0.00)   (0.00) 
Observations   530    538  
Note: The values within parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
